L
ike most households and businesses, the U.S. Treasury maintains a cash balance to buffer short-run fl uctuations in receipts and disbursements. Unlike most households, however, the Treasury's cash balance is highly volatile: between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2010, it varied from as little as $3.1 billion to as much as $188.6 billion (Chart 1). 1 The Treasury divides its cash balance between two types of accounts: a Treasury General Account (TGA) at the Federal Reserve and Treasury Tax and Loan Note accounts (TT&L accounts) at private depository institutions. 2 The behavior of the respective account balances changed dramatically in the fall of 2008. As shown in Chart 2, prior to the fi nancial crisis that followed the collapse of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008 (hereafter, "the crisis"), the TGA mostly fl uctuated in a narrow band around $5 billion while TT&L balances varied more widely. 3 In contrast, since the fall of 2008, TT&L balances have fl uctuated in a narrow band around $2 billion and the TGA has varied widely. ment practices shown in Chart 2. Understanding the relationship between Federal Reserve credit policy and Treasury cash management is important because the relationship illuminates an important but sometimes unappreciated interface between the Treasury and the Fed. It also underscores the symbiotic relationship between the two institutions, in which each assists the other in fulfi lling its statutory responsibilities. 
The Missions of the U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve
The Treasury A principal mission of the U.S. Treasury is collecting income taxes and other taxes prescribed by statute and funding the fi nancial commitments of the U.S. government. 5 In the course of fulfi lling this mandate, the Treasury undertakes a variety of debt management operations, including refi nancing maturing debt with new issues, selling additional debt when expenditures exceed revenues, and retiring debt when the reverse is true. As noted earlier, the Treasury maintains accounts at the Federal Reserve and at private depository institutions to buffer day-to-day fl uctuations in cash fl ows that cannot be accommodated effi ciently with debt management operations.
The Federal Reserve
A principal mission of the Federal Reserve System is managing the U.S. money supply and credit market conditions to promote maximum employment with stable prices and moderate longterm interest rates. 6 Prior to the fall of 2008, the Fed sought to carry out this mandate primarily by (1) targeting the interest rate on overnight loans in the federal funds market and (2) managing the supply of reserves available to the banking system to stabilize the federal funds rate at the target rate. Offi cials purchased (sold) Treasury securities, either outright or through repurchase agreements, 7 when they wanted to add (drain) reserves to keep the funds rate from rising above (falling below) the target.
In the course of responding to the crisis, the Fed provided unprecedented quantities of central bank credit to banks, primary dealers, foreign central banks, and others. The increase in assets on the Fed's balance sheet generated a corresponding increase in central bank liabilities. Currency in circulation expanded modestly, from $835 billion on September 10, 2008, to $890 billion at the end of the year, but deposits at the central bank ballooned from $38 billion to $1.2 trillion, 8 far beyond what depository institutions were required to hold. As described below, the Fed and the Treasury adopted a variety of novel procedures 5 See "Duties and Functions of the U.S. Department of the Treasury, " available at www.treasury.gov/about/role-of-treasury/Pages/default.aspx. 6 See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2005, p. 1).
7 A repurchase agreement is a sale of securities coupled with an agreement to repurchase the same securities at a specifi ed price on a later date. Repurchase agreements are also called "repos. " 8 Deposits at the central bank include reserve balances of depository institutions, U.S. Treasury deposits, foreign offi cial deposits, and service-related deposits (including required clearing balances and adjustments to compensate for fl oat).
to prevent the expanding quantity of reserves from driving the federal funds rate to zero.
The Interface between the Federal Reserve and the Treasury
At fi rst impression, the Federal Reserve and Treasury mandates might seem suffi ciently distinct that the two institutions should be able to function independently of each other. However, the Treasury funnels most of its receipts into, and it disburses most of its payments from, the TGA. Thus, there is a continuous fl ow of funds from private depository institutions to the TGA and back again. During fi scal year 2010, $11.6 trillion fl owed into, and then out of, the TGA.
Flows of funds between the TGA and private depository institutions were important prior to the crisis because the TGA is maintained on the books of the Federal Reserve; increases in TGA balances stemming from Treasury net receipts drained reserves from the banking system and, in the absence of offsetting actions, put upward pressure on the federal funds rate. Conversely, decreases in TGA balances resulting from Treasury net expenditures added reserves to the banking system and, absent offsetting actions, put downward pressure on the funds rate. This dynamic created an important interface between Treasury and Federal Reserve operations. The sections that follow describe fi rst how Treasury and Federal Reserve offi cials cooperated to manage the interface before the crisis, and then how the interface has changed since the onset of the crisis and the expansion of the Fed's balance sheet.
Treasury Cash Management before the Crisis
If, in the pre-crisis regime, the Treasury had deposited all of its receipts in the TGA as soon as they came in, and if it had held the funds in the TGA until they were disbursed, the supply of reserves available to the banking system-and hence the overnight federal funds rate-would have exhibited undesirable volatility. To dampen the volatility, the Fed would have had to conduct frequent and large-scale open market operations, draining reserves when TGA balances were declining and adding reserves when TGA balances were rising. 9 A more effi cient strategy, and the one used by the Treasury in its Tax and Loan program, was to seek to maintain a stable TGA balance.
The Treasury Tax and Loan Program
Prior to the onset of the crisis, the Treasury Tax and Loan program had three principal objectives: processing federal tax A collector institution was a tax collection conduit. It accepted tax payments from businesses (primarily withholdings of personal income taxes, corporate income taxes, and social security contributions) in electronic form and at its teller windows and transferred the payments to the TGA.
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A retainer institution also accepted tax payments but, subject to a limit specifi ed by the institution and pledge of suffi cient collateral, retained the payments in an interest-bearing "Main Account" until called for by the Treasury. If a Main Account balance exceeded the institution's limit, or if it exceeded the collateral value of the assets pledged by the institution, the excess was transferred promptly to the TGA.
An investor institution did everything a retainer institution did and, as described below, also accepted direct investments from the Treasury. 11 The investments were credited to the institution's Main Account and had to be collateralized.
Stabilizing the TGA Balance
Before the onset of the crisis, the Treasury typically aimed to maintain a $5 billion balance in the TGA. 12 The Treasury used well-timed cash calls 13 and direct investments to maintain the actual balance close to the target most of the time (see Chart 2).
Each morning Treasury cash managers and analysts at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York estimated the current day's receipts and disbursements. During a telephone conference call at 9 a.m., they combined the estimates with the previous day's closing TGA balance, scheduled payments of principal and interest, scheduled proceeds from sales of new securities, and other similar items to produce an estimate of the current day's closing balance. If the estimated closing balance exceeded the target, the Treasury would invest the excess at investor institutions 10 Garbade, Partlan, and Santoro (2004) describe in more detail the Treasury Tax and Loan program as it operated before the crisis. The Treasury is presently in the midst of a major revamping of its cash management systems. See Financial Management Service, "Collections and Cash Management Modernization (CCMM), " available at www.fms.treas.gov/ccmm/index.html. 11 A direct investment was a Treasury-directed transfer of funds from the TGA to Treasury's TT&L accounts at investor banks. 12 The target balance, established in 1988, had to be large enough to provide a high degree of confi dence that the TGA would not be overdrawn at the end of a business day since the Fed was not authorized to lend directly to the Treasury. The target balance was sometimes bumped up to $7 billion when cash fl ows were unusually heavy, such as the intervals around tax payment dates. 13 Cash calls are Treasury-directed transfers from TT&L accounts to the TGA. that had suffi cient free collateral and room under their balance limits to accept additional funds. 14 If the estimated balance was below target, the Treasury would call for funds from retainer and investor institutions to make up the shortfall.
Earning Interest on TT&L Balances
The Treasury had three ways to earn interest on TT&L balances. Conventional Main Account balances earned interest at the federal funds rate less 25 basis points. In addition, the Treasury could, at its discretion, make overnight investments in repurchase agreements (repos) and term investments through its Term Investment Option (TIO) program.
The relationship between the rate on Main Account balances and the federal funds rate was set in 1978, in the course of a major overhaul of the TT&L program. A market-linked rate equal to the funds rate less 25 basis points was deemed appropriate for collateralized TT&L balances because, at the time, it was approximately equal to the rate on overnight repurchase agreements on Treasury collateral. However, by the late 1990s, the spread between the federal funds rate and the repo rate had narrowed to 5 basis points and the Treasury began to consider alternatives to obtain a higher rate of return on investments.
The fi rst alternative, the TIO program, was introduced on an experimental basis in April 2002 and made permanent in November 2003. 15 A TIO auction was similar to a Treasury bill auction, but in reverse. The Treasury offered to invest (rather than borrow) a specifi ed amount of money for a specifi ed term and participating institutions bid on the money. On average from March 2006 to March 2007, institutions were willing to pay about 18 basis points more for TIO balances than they had to pay on Main Account balances, 16 in part because TIO balances would remain with the institution for a specifi ed term rather than being subject to daily calls.
In March 2006, the Treasury initiated a pilot program of investing excess funds through overnight repurchase agreements. During the pilot program, the Treasury invested an average of $2.7 billion per day in repurchase agreements against Treasury collateral. Daily offerings ranged between $500 million and $6 billion. 17 On average from March 2006 to March 2007, 14 Occasionally, net fl ows into the TGA were so large that the Treasury exhausted the capacity of investor institutions to accept additional funds and TGA balances rose above the target level by more than several billion dollars. For more on stabilizing the TGA and the timing of direct investments and calls, see, for example, the discussion of the April 2000 tax payments in Garbade, Partlan, and Santoro (2004, p. 6) . 15 See, Garbade, Partlan, and Santoro (2004) and Hrung (2007) .
16 Government Accountability Offi ce (2007, p. 13, Table 2 ). institutions were willing to pay about 21 basis points more for repo balances than they had to pay on Main Account balances, 18 in part for the enhanced certainty of obtaining and retaining funds until the next business day. Table 2 ).
19 Investment Company Institute (2009). A money market mutual fund is said to break the buck when its net asset value falls below $0.995 per share. In that case, the fund has to begin to redeem its shares at net asset value or otherwise act to ensure fair treatment of its shareholders. By the close of business on Wednesday, September 17, AIG had borrowed $28 billion, primary dealers had borrowed $60 billion (through the Primary Dealer Credit Facility 21 ), and depository institutions had added $10 billion to their discount window borrowings. In all, Federal Reserve credit expanded by $100 billion in just two days, and there was more to come. 22 As a result of the Fed's mushrooming loan portfolio, reserve balances of depository institutions increased from $25 billion on September 10 to $82 billion on September 17. It was clear that, in the absence of profound institutional change, reserve balances were going to be vastly in excess of requirements for the foreseeable future and federal funds were going to trade well below the target rate of 2 percent. 23 21 Adrian, Burke, and McAndrews (2009) The Treasury announced three SFP sales that day for a total of $100 billion. The proceeds from the sales were deposited in a newly created SFP account at the Fed, thereby draining approximately $100 billion of reserves from the banking system.
By Friday, October 3, two weeks and two days after the start of the Supplementary Financing Program, the Treasury had issued eleven SFP bills (one of which was to refi nance a maturing SFP bill) and the program had drained about $355 billion of reserve balances. SFP bills peaked at $560 billion between October 20 and November 12 (Chart 4).
On October 6, the Federal Reserve announced that it would begin to pay interest on reserve balances effective Thursday, October 9. This new feature of monetary policy was expected to allow the Fed to continue to use its lending program to address conditions in credit markets while also maintaining the funds rate close to the target level, even in the absence of the SFP program. 
Consequences for Treasury Cash Management
The structure of interest rates after December 2008 prompted the Treasury to make a second change in its cash management practices since it now had an economic incentive to keep its cash balances in the Treasury General Account rather than in Treasury Tax and Loan Note accounts. When the overnight federal funds rate fell below 25 basis points, the TT&L rate on Main Account balances went to zero and the likely rates of At the same time, the volatile swings in TGA balances associated with the decision to keep essentially all of the Treasury's operating cash balances in the TGA (see Chart 2) did not cause a problem for the Fed because the swings did not result in any comparable volatility in the federal funds rate. In particular, expanding TGA balances did not reduce the quantity of reserves available to the banking system to a level at all close to what banks wanted or were required to hold and thus did not put upward pressure on the funds rate.
Consequences for the Supplementary Financing Program
In principle, paying interest on reserves could have led the Treasury to terminate the Supplementary Financing Program. Adhering to its November 17, 2008, announcement, the Treasury 32 However, the Treasury continued to keep $2 billion in TT&L accounts until December 29, 2011, to ensure that the functionalities of the TT&L program remained intact in the event that the Fed returned to the pre-crisis structure of monetary policy. By 2012, collector and retainer designations were eliminated, and the TT&L investment program was shut down. Treasury indicated that it planned on implementing a new investment program when market conditions warranted and that more details would be announced when they became available. did reduce the size of the program, but it did not eliminate it entirely (Chart 4).
There were several reasons for not eliminating the Supplementary Financing Program at the end of 2008. First, SFP bills soaked up a nontrivial quantity of excess reserves. 33 Second, higher SFP balances, like higher TGA balances, reduced the volume of reserves on which the Federal Reserve had to pay interest and were, therefore, fiscally beneficial to the Treasury. And third, the Supplementary Financing Program provided market participants with additional quantities of a short-term, credit risk-free instrument that was unusually attractive in the midst of the crisis. 34
Conclusion
The Treasury Tax and Loan Note program has long been an exemplar of cooperation between the Federal Reserve and the Treasury, with the Fed serving as the Treasury's fi scal agent in maintaining the Treasury General Account and with the Treasury issuing cash calls and making direct investments to stabilize the TGA at a specifi ed target level. The 2008-09 crisis triggered a further deepening of the close relationship between the two institutions. When the Fed's balance sheet ballooned in September 2008 as the crisis deepened, the Treasury announced, at the Fed's request, the Supplementary Financing Program to soak up excess reserves and to keep the federal funds rate from being driven down to zero. The subsequent introduction of interest on reserves left the Treasury free to abandon those aspects of the TT&L program aimed at stabilizing the TGA and allowed it to pursue cash management practices that, in light of the new monetary regime, were in the best interest of taxpayers. The Treasury's cash management and investment strategy continues to evolve, guided by the goals of earning a fair return on investment, ensuring that the funds available in the TGA are suffi cent to avoid an overdraft, and avoiding interference with the implementation of monetary policy. When the interest rates that the Treasury receives on investments are higher, it may resume investing its surplus funds with the private sector, as it did prior to 2009. However, if short-term interest rates remain close to current levels and there is no need to target the TGA, then Treasury investments are likely to remain low or nonexistent since holding funds in the TGA is more remunerative than investing funds with the private sector.
Nevertheless, a signifi cant decline in excess reserves resulting from a shift in monetary policy may once again make it necessary to target a more stable TGA, so that TGA volatility does not cause 33 Bernanke (2009) observed that "issuance of [SFP] bills effectively drains reserves from the banking system, improving monetary control. " 34 Hrung and Seligman (2011, p. 7) noted that "an incidental by-product" of the SFP program "was that it increased the amount of high-quality collateral available in the market, helping to alleviate . . . supply-side stresses in the money markets. . . . " 
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